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% Medium Length Graduate Curriculum Vitae

% LaTeX Template

% Version 1.1 (9/12/12)

%

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%

% Important note:

% This template requires the res.cls file to be in the same directory as the

% .tex file. The res.cls file provides the resume style used for structuring the

% document.

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% PACKAGES AND OTHER DOCUMENT CONFIGURATIONS

%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\documentclass[margin, 10pt]{res} % Use the res.cls style, the font size can be changed to 11pt or 12pt here

\usepackage{helvet} % Default font is the helvetica postscript font

%\usepackage{newcent} % To change the default font to the new century schoolbook postscript font uncomment this line and comment the one above

\usepackage{abstract}

\usepackage{textcomp}

\usepackage{amssymb}

\renewcommand{\abstractname}{} % clear the title

\renewcommand{\absnamepos}{empty}

\setlength{\textwidth}{5.1in} % Text width of the document

\begin{document}

%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

% NAME AND ADDRESS SECTION

%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\moveleft.5\hoffset\centerline{\large\bf Matthew C. Millard} % Your name at the top

\moveleft\hoffset\vbox{\hrule width\resumewidth height 1pt}\smallskip % Horizontal line after name; adjust line thickness by changing the '1pt'

\moveleft.5\hoffset\centerline{11005 A Camino Playa Carmel, San Diego, CA, 92124}

\moveleft.5\hoffset\centerline{mcmillard@crimson.ua.edu}

\moveleft.5\hoffset\centerline{matthewcmillard@gmail.com}

\moveleft.5\hoffset\centerline{www.matthewmillard.com}

\begin{resume}

\section{Education}

\textbf{University of Alabama}, Tuscaloosa, AL\\

PhD, Political Science \hfill 2018\\

Major Field: \textit{Intentational Relations}\\

Minor Fields: \textit{American Politics and Political Theory}\\

\textbf{Duke University}, Durham, NC\\

MA, \textit{Political Science} \hfill 2011\\

\textbf{The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina}, Charleston, SC\\

BA, \textit{International Politics and Military Affairs and English}, \textit{Magna Cum Laude} \hfill 2009\\

\textbf{Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), University of Michigan}, Ann Arbor, MI \hfill Summer 2014, 2017\\

\textit{EITM Certification}\\

\begin{abstract}

\textit{MLE for Generalized Linear Models, Introduction to R Statistical Computing Environment, Regression Analysis II: Linear Models, Mathematics for Social Scientists II, Bayesian Modeling for the Social Sciences I: Introduction and Application,

Network Analysis I: Introduction}

\end{abstract}

%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

% Technology SKILLS SECTION

%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\section{Dissertation}

Learning the Trade: State Leaders and the Construction of International Relations (Chair: Douglas M. Gibler, University of Alabama; Susan Sample, University of the Pacific; Derrick Frazier, Air Command and Staff College; Dennis Foster, VMI; Toby Rider, Texas Tech; Stephen Borrelli, University of Alabama)\\

\begin{abstract}

I argue that conflict can best be understood as a learned practice where states learn the "steps to war (Senese and Vasquez 2008). To do this, I use an argument that examines alliances and how leaders make alliance texts that heavily copy from previous alliance texts, a case study of the arms race between the USSR and USA, and how states involved in rivalries are more likely to initiate and engage in disputes with non-rivalrous dyads.

\end{abstract}

\section{Publications}

\textbf{Millard, M.C. and Porter, C.} ``Testing the Hard Case: Reactive Devaluation, Iran, and Nuclear Negotiations''\textit{Journal of Political Science 46} (2018) \\

\begin{abstract}

To assess the level of reactive devaluation in foreign policy negotiations, we conduct a survey of approximately 400 respondents. Our analysis measures the variance of relative support/opposition to the Iranian deal when the author of the proposal is varied. We examine the specific case of negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program to test our theory of psychological thresholds of trust in Iran and Islam, which when low, should trigger reactive devaluation. Our study improves upon existing literature by incorporating a larger and more generalizable sample and by testing a harder case for identifying the phenomenon. We find that the process of reactive devaluation is apparent in the face of non-existential threats, but may be more nuanced than previously suggested.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} ``Rethinking the Kantian Peace: Evidence from a Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative Measure of Norm Diffusion'' \textit{New Global Studies 12.3:325-341} (2018)\\

\begin{abstract}

This article revisits in today’s global setting the debate among international relations scholars over the so-called Kantian or democratic peace. In particular, it argues that findings made by S. M. Mitchell in a seminal 2002 article in the American Journal of Political Science regarding the diffusion of norms via third party conflict resolution relied upon a questionable methodology and now require belated revision. An alternative measure of norm diffusion would rely upon the proportion of democratic states, particularly contiguous states, in a given region. Moreover, a more detailed look at such diffusion after 1945 suggests important differences over the viability of democratic peace, especially regarding state behavior outside the Western Hemisphere

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} ``Challenging Institutions: Getting Goods or Getting your own Institutions?'' \textit{Journal of Regional Security} (2017)\\

\begin{abstract}

I present a discussion of the current state of liberal internationalism as it relates to international organizations. I maintain that the literature focuses too much on liberal internationalism and less on non-liberal internationalism. This is problematic in a world where non-liberal states are increasingly becoming important players in the international system, as is the case with Russia and China. I argue that non-liberal states have a variety of approaches in their dealings with international institutions that can enable them to maximize their net gains from institutions. These are: 1.) keep using the liberal institution; 2.) utilize institutional a la cartism (forum shop); 3.) create an anti-liberal institution; or 4.) opt-out of institutions all together. Scholars and practitioners alike should acknowledge that international institutions can be a vehicle whereby non-liberal states maximize their power and diminish the power and influence of non-liberal states.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} ``A Tale of Two Systems: Learning to Cooperate and Compete in the International System'' \textit{Spectra 6(1)} (2017)\\

\begin{abstract}

I argue that states and leaders in competitive frameworks learn to behave with realist policies from their interactions with other states and leaders and, in the absence of these interactions, they rely on previous experience to inform them in the decision-making process. Contrary to what scholars of the realist tradition maintain, I do not argue that the tenants consistent with realism are effectively human nature (for instance, Morgenthau, 1948) or due to the self-help, anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz, 1979). Instead, leaders in conflictual relationships learn these methods are an effective way in which to respond to the world around them as they learn the constraints that are placed on them by other state\textquotesingle s leaders. And in the absence of previous interactions, they will rely on background variables, such as their own experience, to guide them in how to interact with other leaders.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} Editor and foreword, Special Curated Issue, \textit{Conflict Management and Peace Science}, (Alliances) (2016)\\

http://cmp.sagepub.com/site/VSI/Reexamining\\_Alliance\\_Literature.xhtml\\

\begin{abstract}

I explore the most important alliance articles from Conflict Management and Peace Science. I show that most focus throughout the journal\textquotesingle s history concerned arms races, the other primary way to prepare for war. I argue that the alliance literature has been neglected and overlooked and, upon reexamination, can provide useful information about how we can greater understand the causal relationships with war and dispute onset.

\end{abstract}

\section{Working Papers}

%1st%

%2nd%

\textbf{Millard, M.C. and Bacchus, T.} ``Keeping it Secret: Secret Alliance Texts as Signaling and Coordination Agreements''\\

Submitted to \textit{Journal of Global Security Studies} (under review)\\\begin{abstract}

Though alliance agreements are an important part of signaling intentions to another side\textquotesingle s potential foes or coordinating between states (Niou and Ordeshook 1994; also, Gibler 2009), there are instances in which it is useful to pursue secret alliances to formally link states. Examining all alliance texts from 1816 to 2010, we argue that sates are more likely to make secret alliances if they have prior experience with secret alliances. We argue that this is likely because those state\textquotesingle s success with secret alliances demonstrated they were useful tools of statecraft. Similarly, major powers are more likely to make secret alliances because they are more likely to want to hide the context of the secret alliance that they made because these behaviors will elicit a response from other major power states. We also find that, in conjunction with the signaling literature, secret alliances are less likely to be pursued in defensive alliances because defensive alliances are designed to be open so as to signal to intentions to hostile states. However, secret alliances are more likely in neutrality agreements specifically because these states wish to send clear signals in private to one another that they do not seek conflict.

\end{abstract}

%4th Paper DONE%

\textbf{Gartzke, E., Millard, M.C., and Hulme, M. P.} ``Throwing in the Towel: Democracies and the Acceptance of Defeat''\\

Submitted to \textit{International Security} (under review)\\

\begin{abstract}

Extensive research makes the case that democracies are more likely to win the wars that they fight. However, what happens when democracies are destined to lose a military contest? Theories of democratic victory emphasize incentives affecting elected leaders that encourage superior military performance. These same incentives suggest that democratic leaders should be especially reluctant to admit defeat. As the findings reported here demonstrate, democracies tend to take longer to “throw in the towel” and acknowledge defeat when military contests are not going well. Indeed, it is especially difficult to end disputes when both sides are democratic. This relationship helps to substantiate the role of regime type in affecting military conflict even as it also clarifies important questions about process and the micro-foundations of democratic victory.

\end{abstract}

%5th%

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} ``Of Mountains, Rivers, and Oceans: Territorial Effects on Military Expenditures''\\

Submitted to \textit{International Studies Quarterly} (under review)\\

\begin{abstract}

While much work has been completed analyzing the role of geography’s effect on conflict, less work has been done to demonstrate how geography affects military budgets. I construct models to analyze the role of geographic measures, along with other explanations, and their impact on defense budgets. I argue that a state\textquotesingle s ability to collect revenues for defense are heightened when borders are clearly defined and easily defended. Using geographic data, I show that states clearly defined by rivers and oceans spend less money on defense budgets as a proportion of GDP because the prospects of conflict are lower and internal social cohesion is higher, decreasing the need for large standing militaries for either repression, expansion, or defense. I find that this effect is exogenous to threat. On the other hand, more mountainous states spend more on defense due to increased costs of defense and decreased sense of identity among local populations. Situating this debate within the state development literature helps us answer important questions regarding state formation and consolidation and the move to peacefully interact with neighbors.

\end{abstract}

%3rd%

\textbf{Krell, M. R. and Millard, M.C.} ``The Hidden Utility of Brexit''\\

Submitted to \textit{European Journal of Political Research} (under review)\\

\begin{abstract}

We argue that identity plays an important role in decisions regarding national independence movements. We further argue that purely economic models of rational actors fails to capture the role of identity because of the difficulty in operationalizing the concept. Using a large-n panel survey of British respondents, we examine what role identity played in respondents vote and vote intentions in the June 2016 Brexit vote. In examining pre-and post-election data, we find evidence to support our hypothesis that self-ascribed identity as British or European was an important factor in a respondent\textquotesingle s decision on voting to remain or leave the European Union.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} ``Making the Conflict Jump: Evidence for a Mechanism of Diffusive Violence''\\

\begin{abstract}

Below, I argue that evidence of diffusively learned conflict behavior can be found by examining states in rivalries and their interactions with non-rivalrous dyads. Using Thompson\textquotesingle s (2001) definition of strategic rivalries and MID 4.01, I examine all MIDs for evidence of externalizing the lessons of rivalrous behavior. Using an evolutionary and diffusive framework, I argue that states perform a conflict jump when they apply the lessons learned in rivalrous conflicts to those with whom they are not engaged in rivalries. With these variables and tracing of the effects of how violence spreads, I find that states that are involved in a rivalry are likely to externalize this conflict behavior to other states. Specifically, I find that these states are more likely to initiate conflict against another state, they are more likely to use force or enter into war, and they are more likely to use higher levels of violence. I find that this effect operates independent of third-party alliance ties with rivalrous states.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Millard, M.C.} ``When States Copy: An Analysis of Alliance Texts and Learning in International Relations, 1891-1995''\\

\begin{abstract}

Previous scholarly research on alliances have focused on how alliances serve as both signaling and coordination mechanisms or as credible commitments to an alliance partner. However, the texts used to initiate a formal alliance have largely been ignored. Previous studies have missed the textual significance because they often focus on how alliances relate to the probability of war. Instead, I examine alliance texts for evidence of learning. I argue that leaders of states are likely to copy previous alliance commitments, as they act as instructional tools as to how a leader should form a successful alliance. Relying first on their own state\textquotesingle s experiences in making alliances, they then look towards alliance texts made by other states where those texts act as secondary instructional devices. I construct a matrix of state alliances from 1891-1995 and use this as a proxy variable for learning. I find that leaders and states with less alliance experience are more likely to copy other alliance texts. I also find that contiguity, distance between capital cities, regional difference, and a difference in national capabilities are likely to impact a leader\textquotesingle s decision to copy from another alliance.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Gibler, DM, Foster, D., and Millard, M. C.} ``Is Anyone Listening? Crisis Signaling by the British House of Commons, 1918-2004''\\

\begin{abstract}

Several prominent theories suggest that legislative opposition to leadership policies in international crises can moderate governmental stances and/or embolden adversaries. However, empirical tests of these theories have looked only at indirect measures of both independent and dependent variables. We change this by employing large-scale, textual analysis software to examine all British Parliamentary debates concerning international crises, for the period 1918-2004. We account for variations in the levels of certainty, anger, and anxiety expressed by Members of Parliament during debates, and identify the level of agreement among party members. Our analyses of these debates suggest our measures perform well since both certainty and anxiety predict British crisis escalation quite well. However, potential signals of calculated risk-taking propensity on the part of the House of Commons do not, independently, influence the escalatory behavior of the UK\textquotesingle s primary adversaries in interstate crises. Certainty and anxiety in British Parliament are associated with increased escalation by adversaries, even when controlling for common predictors of crisis escalation. We discuss the implications of these arguments for theories of democratic signaling.

\end{abstract}

\textbf{Gibler, D.M. and Millard, M.C.} ``Why States Ally: Using Alliance Texts to Understand Choice''\\

\begin{abstract}

We argue that while states make alliances based off immediate policy concerns, we can also examine alliance texts for evidence that states and their leaders accede to the norms of particular historical eras. Examining all alliance texts from 1920 to 1995, we argue that states whose political system does not match the predominate political system at the time are more likely to copy alliance texts from those predominate states because they send signals of acceding to the norms of the international system. In particular, we find that democratic states were more likely to copy alliance texts prior to World War II as a way to signal conforming to the norms of the more numerous non-democracies. Likewise, beginning in 1960, we find that heads of state who were former rebels and labor leaders are more likely to copy alliance texts as a way of appearing to conform to the norms of the more numerous democracies in the world.

\end{abstract}

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% PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE SECTION

%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\section{Teaching}

\textbf{Saint Louis University} - Visiting Instructor\\

Instructor of Record

\begin{itemize}

\item POLS 1150: American Political Systems \hfill Fall 2017

\item POLS 2000: Methods in Political Science \hfill Fall 2017, Spring 2018

\begin{itemize}

\item POLS 2000: Methods in Political Science Lab \hfill Fall 2017, Spring 2018

\end{itemize}

\item POLS 5020: Advanced Topics in Research Methods \hfill Fall 2017\\

\indent Graduate level Quantitative Methods I course

\end{itemize}

\textbf{University of Alabama} - Graduate Teaching Assistant\\

Instructor of Record

\begin{itemize}

\item PSC 442: International Conflict \hfill Spring 2017

\item PSC 202: Political Science Research Methods \hfill Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Summer I 2016, Summer II 2016

\item PSC 101: Introduction to American Politics \hfill Spring 2015

\item PSC 204: Introduction to International Relations \hfill Fall 2014, Summer I 2017

\end{itemize}

Teaching Assistant\\

\begin{itemize}

\item PSC 205: Introduction to Political Theory

\item PSC 203: Introduction to Comparative Politics \hfill Fall 2012, Spring 2013

\item PSC 435: War and Peace \hfill Fall 2016

\item PSC 522: Quantitative Methods \hfill Fall 2016\\

\indent Graduate level. Graded problem sets and taught Stata labs to Ph.D. and M.A. students

\end{itemize}

Additional Teaching Experience

\begin{itemize}

\item Developed pre-test and post-test for introductory level courses in International Relations and American Politics at the University of Alabama.

\item Assisted students on construction of a module for US Department of Homeland Security for project entitled Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism (P2P) in partnership with EdVenture Partners. Students constructed a module via social media outreach to combat violent extremism.

\item International Studies Undergraduate Academic Advisor, University of Alabama (2016).

\item Other courses prepared: Conflict, War, and Peace and Quantitative Methods I

\end{itemize}

\section{Experience}

\textbf{University of California, San Diego}, Center for Peace and Security Studies \hfill San Diego, CA\\

\textit{Postdoctoral Research Fellow} (two-year award) \hfill Current\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Conducted research on conflict processes at the Center for Peace and Security Studies

\item Award amount: \$152,200

\end{itemize}

\textbf{Saint Louis University}, Department of Political Science \hfill St. Louis, MO\\

\textit{Instructor/Visiting Assistant Professor} \hfill 2017-2018\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Instructor of record for courses in graduate methods and undergraduate methods and American courses.

\end{itemize}

Ambassador Bruce Heyman, United States Ambassador to Canada \hfill Ottawa, Ontario\\

Embassy of the United States of America \hfill Summer 2015\\

Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs\\

\textit{Temporary Assistant}\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Security clearance level: SECRET (granted 2015)

\item Planned and coordinated ambassador's travel, speeches, and appearances across US and Canada.

\item Responsible for diplomatic greeting and protocol familiarity.

\item Raised funds (CAN \$277,000 raised for largest July 4th celebration outside US).

\item Aided in other administrative responsibilities such as note taking at briefings, clearance officer duties, diplomatic protocol, planning and organizing of events.

\end{itemize}

\textbf{University of Alabama}, Department of Political Science \hfill Tuscaloosa, AL\\

\textit{Graduate Teaching Assistant} \hfill 2012- 2017\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Received tuition paid in full in addition to a stipend of \$13,500 per academic year.

\end{itemize}

\textbf{University of Alabama}, Department of Political Science \hfill Tuscaloosa, AL\\

\textit{Graduate Research Assistant} \hfill 2013-2014\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Coded MIDs and civil war overlaps for Karl DeRouen and Doug Gibler. Facilitated through a grant from Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden to Prof. Gibler and DeRouen totaling \$38,456.

\end{itemize}

U.S. Representative Robert Aderholt \hfill Washington, DC\\

\textit{Intern} \hfill Summer 2014\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Responsible for constituent services, meeting attendance, and other administrative tasks.

\end{itemize}

Luntz, Maslansky, and Associates (The Word Doctors) \hfill New York, NY and Arlington, VA\\

\textit{Research Intern} \hfill 2010\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Completed research and coding for political advertisements, congressional testimonies, and Fortune 500 companies.

\end{itemize}

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre \hfill Ottawa, Ontario\\

\textit{Research Intern} \hfill 2008\\

\begin{itemize}

\item Conducted research on gender-based violence in Darfur that was utilized by the center for the training of international peacekeeping force being sent to Sudan

\end{itemize}

\section{Fellowships, Grants, Awards}

Hayek Fund for Scholars, IHS travel grant, CEEISA ISA, 2019-\$600\\

Hayek Fund for Scholars, IHS travel grant, ISA, 2017\\

Institute for Human Studies, APSA travel grant, 2017-\$450\\

Institute for Humane Studies, ICPSR grant, 2017-\$3300\\

Travel grant, (Univ. of AL Graduate School), ISA Midwest, 2016\\

Travel grant, ISA Conference, 2017\\

Prestage-Cook travel grant award, SPSA Annual Conference, 2016 \\

Travel grant, ISA South Conference, 2015 \\

Travel grant, (Univ. of AL. Political Science Department), Peace Science Society, 2015\\

Graduate Teaching Assistant Fellowship, 2012-2013; 2014-2015\\

Graduate Student's Association Travel Grant, 2014\\

Travel grant, Department of Political Science, University of Alabama, 2016\\

Phyllis Sparks Scholarship (The Citadel)\\

C. Tolbert Goolsby Scholarship (The Citadel)\\

D.D. Nicholson Scholarship (The Citadel)\\

Class of 1919 Scholarship (The Citadel)\\

Dean's List, 8 times (The Citadel)\\

President's List, 3 times (The Citadel)\\

\section{Conference \\ Presentations}

Institute for Human Studies, Scholarship and Free Society, June 2012 \\

\indent ``Conflicting Notions: Locke, Property, Virtue, and Early American Republican Thought''\\

\\

University of South Carolina, Graduate Student Conference, February 2013 \\

\indent ``The Calculus of the Casualty-Aversion Hypothesis: Afghanistan, Public Opinion in the Use of Drones, and Elite Strategic Choice''\\

\\

Texas A\&M, Reflections on Violence Conference, March 2013 \\

\indent ``Gender-Based Violence in Darfur''\\

\\

Southern Political Science Conference, January 2015\\

\indent ``Uncle Sam is here to Help: An Analysis of US Involvement in International Crises, 1919-2007''\\

\\

International Studies Association Conference, February 2015\\

\indent ``Uncle Sam is here to Help: An Analysis of US Involvement in International Crises, 1919-2007''\\

\\

International Studies Association (Southern), October 2015\\

\indent ``Learning to Race: An Analysis of the Soviet/American Arms Race''\\

\\

International Studies Association (Midwest), November 2015\\

\indent ``Learning the Trade: State Leaders and the Teaching of International Relations''\\

\\

Educational Studies in Psychology and Research Methodology, April 2015 (with Chase Porter, University of Alabama)\\

\indent ``Revisiting Reactive Devaluation: The Case of Nuclear Weapons'' (poster presentation)\\

\\

Southern Political Science Association, January 2016 (with Chase Porter, University of Alabama)\\

\indent ``Revisiting Reactive Devaluation: The Case of Nuclear Weapons''\\

\\

International Studies Association (Midwest), November 2016\\

\indent ``Learning to Become Friends: Plagiarism and the Making of International Alliances''\\

\\

International Studies Association (Midwest), November 2016\\

\indent ``Introducing the PLAD Dataset: Plagiarism, Leaders, and Alliances Data''\\

\\

Southern Political Science Association, January 2017\\

\indent ``Learning to Become Friends: Plagiarism and the Making of International Alliances''\\

\\

International Studies Association, February 2017\\

\indent ``Learning Different Lessons: New State Membership, MID Success, and MID Initiation''\\

\\

International Studies Association, February 2017\\

\indent ``Learning to Become Friends: Plagiarism and the Making of International Alliances''\\

\\

Midwest Political Science Association, March 2017 (with Matthew Reid Krell, University of Alabama)\\

\indent ``The Hidden Utility of Brexit''\\

\\

American Political Science Association. September 2017\\

\indent ``Learning Different Lessons: Externalizing Rivalry Lessons to Unrelated MIDs''\\

\\

International Studies Association (Midwest), November 2017 (with Doug Gibler, University of Alabama)\\

\indent ``Why States Ally: Using Alliance Texts to Understand Choice''\\

\\

Alabama Political Science Association, March 2018\\

\indent ``Rethinking The Kantian Peace: Evidence from Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative Measures of Norm Diffusion''\\

\\

International Studies Association, April 2018\\

\indent ``Is Anyone Listening? Crisis Signaling by the British House of Commons, 1918-2004''

\\

\\

Americna Political Science Association, 2018\\

\indent ``Keeping it Secret: Secret Alliance Texts as Signaling and Coordination Agreements''

\\

\\

Internaitonal Studies Association, 2019\\

\indent ``Military Expenditure and Size as a Function of Border Threat and Historical Experience''

\\

\\

International Studies Association, 2019\\

\indent ``Keeping it Secret: Secret Alliance Texts as Signaling and Coordination Agreements''

\\

\\

Midwest Poltiical Science Association, 2019\\

\indent ``Of Mountains, Battleships, and Tanks: Territorial Effects on Military Expenditures''

\\

\\

Central and Eastern European International Studies Association-ISA, 2019\\

\indent ``Military Expenditure and Size as a Function of Border Threat and Historical Experience''

\\\\

Central and Eastern European International Studies Association-ISA, 2019\\

\indent ``Nobody Knows What Goes on Behind Closed Doors: Experience and Secret Diplomacy''

\\

\\

European Political Science Association, 2019\\

\indent ``Throwing in the Towel: Democracies and Lost Disputes''

\\

\\

American Poltiical Science Association

, 2019\\

\indent ``Of Mountains, Rivers, and Oceans: Territorial Effects on Military Expenditures"

\\

\\

\section{Additional}

Panel Chair (Ethnicity and Patterns of Violence), APSA, 2019\\

Discussant (Rebel Leaders), APSA, 2019\\

Discussant (Cyber, Nuclear, Deterrence), CEEISA-ISA, 2019\\

Panel Chair (Foreign Policy Preferences and Alliances), MPSA, 2019\\

Discussant (Emotions and Foreign Policy Decisions), MPSA, 2019\\

Panel Chair (International Relations), Alabama Political Science Association Conference, 2018\\

Discussant (International Relations), Alabama Political Science Association Conference, 2018\\

Reviewer, \textit {Conflict Management and Peace Science}, 2018\\

SLU undergraduate/graduate research conference, 2017-provided assistance with organizing and running the first political science research forum on Saint Louis University\textquotesingle s campus.\\

Textbook Reviewer, Dixon, J.C., Singleton, R.A. and Straits, B.C., 2015. \textbf {The Process of Social Research.} Oxford: Oxford University Press.\\

Discussant, University of Alabama Department of Political Science Colloquium, Dr. Kristen Wiegand, Fall 2014\\

Time-Series Analysis workshop, April 2015, Dr. Walt Enders, University of Alabama\\

Academic Writing Workshop, April 2015, Dr. Doug Gibler, University of Alabama\\

Advisory Committee, \textit {The Citadel Magazine}, 2008-2009\\

Volunteer, University of Alabama Undergraduate Research and Creativity Conference, 2015\\

Cyber Security Awareness, PS 800 Certificate, George P. Schultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State\\

\section{Service}

Treasurer, Political Science Graduate Student Association, 2015-2016\\

Company Commander, The Citadel\\

Company Honor Representative, The Citadel\\

Company Clerk, The Citadel\\

Squad Corporal, The Citadel\\

Company Operations Sergeant, The Citadel\\

Squad Sergeant (training cadre), The Citadel\\

\section{Professional \\ Memberships}

Peace Science Society\\

International Studies Association\\

European Political Science Association\\

American Political Science Association\\

\indent \textit{Sections: Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, Intelligence Studies, International Security Studies}\\

ISA South\\

ISA Midwest\\

Southern Political Science Association\\

Phi Sigma Alpha \\

Pi Kappa Phi\\

\section{Computer \\ Skills}

Stata, \LaTeX

\section{References}

Dr. Doug Gibler, Professor of Political Science (Dissertation chair)\\

Institute for Social Science Research, University of Alabama\\

dmgibler@ua.edu\\

\\

Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science (Supervisor)\\

University of California, San Diego\\

egartzke@ucsd.edu\\

\\

Dr. Derrick Frazier, Professor of Strategic and Security Studies (Dissertation co-chair)\\

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, United States Air Force\\

derrick.v.frazier@gmail.com\\

\\

Dr. Ellen Carnaghan, Professor of Political Science (Department Chair)\\

Saint Louis University\\

ellen.carnaghan@slu.edu\\

\\

Confidential letters of recommendation can be obtained from kmnolen@ua.edu

\end{resume}

\end{document}